Causal and Non-Causal Explanations of Artificial

Intelligence by Grimsley, Christopher
Causal and Non-Causal Explanations of Artificial
Intelligence
Christopher Grimsley
4,818 words
Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs), a particularly effective type of artificial
intelligence, currently lack a scientific explanation. The philosophy of science is
uniquely equipped to handle this problem. Computer science has attempted,
unsuccessfully, to explain DNNs. I review these contributions, then identify
shortcomings in their approaches. The complexity of DNNs prohibits the
articulation of relevant causal relationships between their parts, and as a result
causal explanations fail. I show that many non-causal accounts, though more
promising, also fail to explain AI. This highlights a problem with existing accounts
of scientific explanation rather than with AI or DNNs.
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1 The Need for Explainable Artificial Intelligence
The use of artificial intelligence (AI) has expanded considerably in the past decade. AI is
increasingly being used to make high-stakes decisions, often under questionable
circumstances that indicate the presence of racial or gender bias, including granting or
denying loan applications (Fuster et al. 2018), deciding which prisoners are eligible for
parole (Khademi and Honavar 2019), and diagnosing mental health disorders (Bennett et
al. 2019). If AI is used to make these decisions — especially if these decisions appear to
have reinforced biases present elsewhere in society — understanding how the algorithm
made the decision is essential. Absent explanation, arbitrary or biased decisions may go
unchecked. Computer scientists have recognized this problem and have begun developing
explainable AI (XAI), but many of their strategies haphazardly employ a mix of causal,
psychological, and counterfactual strategies that fail to generate adequate explanations.
It is impossible to explain AI without first explaining explanation. The philosophy of
science is uniquely positioned to take on this problem and offer solutions by examining
the meaning of scientific explanation and developing an account of explanation which
adequately explains AI.
An explainable algorithm is one for which a true, satisfactory explanation exists. An
interpretable algorithm is one for which a complete account of the relationships between
the steps in the algorithm exists. In many cases, AI decision and classification
algorithms are neither explainable nor interpretable. Many of the AI algorithms used in
these cases are deep neural networks (DNNs), a type of algorithm whose complexity
defies explanation in a particularly striking manner. Because explanation through
merely technological means is lagging behind the complexity of the networks that are in
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need of an explanation, it is reasonable to conclude that the solution to this problem
cannot be technological. If this is the case, a potential solution can be found in the ways
in which explanation is conceptualized within the context of AI. In order to solve the
explainability problem, it is first necessary to articulate an appropriate model of
explanation which can be effectively applied in this context.
I argue that recent attempts by computer scientists to develop XAI fail because they
do not employ a theoretically-grounded concept of explanation. Further, I show that it is
necessary to employ non-causal accounts of explanation in order to solve the problem of
explainability in AI. I begin with a brief overview of the aspects of AI that are relevant
to my argument. Then I discuss two existing methods for developing XAI: one causal,
and one non-causal. I demonstrate why each approach fails to generate a satisfactory
explanation, then I propose alternative non-causal possibilities and explore the viability
of each. I conclude that existing approaches to both causal and non-causal explanation
fail to fit the needs of XAI, though of the two approaches, non-causal accounts hold
greater promise.
1.1 Deep Neural Networks
‘Machine learning,’1 an increasingly common form of AI, is a broad term that describes
programs that can work with unexpected input data without being explicitly
programmed to do so. One of the more common contemporary approaches to machine
learning is the neural network. Neural networks attempt to replicate the behavior of
biological brains by linking input and output together via various intermediary nodes in
1for a more comprehensive overview, see Buckner (2019).
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a network. Each node is called a ‘neuron’, hence ‘neural network’. Neural networks
contain multiple layers including an input layer, an output layer, and one or more
‘hidden layers’ between the input and output. Each layer is made up of a group of
neurons. Neural networks with more than three hidden layers are called deep neural
networks (DNNs). DNNs produce a complex, often non-interpretable model that is used
in decision or classification tasks. In what is called ‘supervised learning,’ a ‘trained
model’ is created by providing labeled datasets to the DNN, which iterates over the
labeled data and builds a model capable of making the correct decision or classification
given novel data. In other words, the deep neural model is built with the deep neural
network. DNNs and the models they produce are both in need of explanation.
2 The Current Landscape: Two Case Studies
Computer scientists have made use of two contrasting strategies in order to develop XAI.
Most researchers attempting to build explainable DNNs appear to prefer causal forms of
explanation,2 however some have attempted to develop non-causally explainable DNNs.
I present instances of each approach and discuss their relationships to the explanation
literature in the philosophy of science.
2.1 Case Study One: “Rationalizations”
One approach to XAI is to develop algorithms that produce patterns of explananda that
imitate human reasoning. This is analogous to chatbots that imitate human texting
2See for example Yang et al. (2016), Jain and Wallace (2019), Khademi and
Honavarand (2019), and Sharma, Henderson, and Ghosh (2020)
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patterns. For instance, Harrison et al. (2017) uses two AIs. The first plays the classic
video game Frogger, and the second explains the actions of the first by translating
internal game state data to natural-language approximations of human-supplied
explanations. In order to accomplish this, the research team recorded human subjects
playing Frogger, then periodically paused the game and asked the subjects to verbally
explain an action that they recently took. The human responses were used as training
data for the “explainer” DNN.
Importantly, the explainer DNN was not generating veridical statements about the
internal state of the game-playing DNN, but was generating a unique natural-language
statement based on data gathered from human players when in similar in-game
situations. This approach generates psychologically satisfying explanations of AI
behavior. Because the generated explanations are only meant to approximate
human-supplied explanations of similar situations, a tradeoff is made between accurately
reporting internal DNN states and psychologically satisfying explanations. The authors
accept this tradeoff in order to obtain quickly-generated and human-like explanations.
The authors write that “rationalization is fast, sacrificing absolute accuracy for real-time
response” (Harrison et al. 2017, 1).
The explainer DNN does not supply a veridical explanation of the decision making
process used by the game-player DNN. Instead it produces statements that approximate
human-generated explanations when faced with similar in-game circumstances. Another
much deeper problem with this model is that, since the explanation of one DNN is itself
generated by a different, independent DNN, there is now a need for an explanation of the
explanation. If one black-box system is explained by appealing to a second black-box
system, nothing has actually been explained. The number of phenomena in need of
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explanation has actually increased.
If humans depend on the use of AI for a critical task, it is important that a sense of
trust in that AI is maintained. One goal of the research of Harrison et al. (2017) is to
provide explanations that reassure human operators of AI that the AI had a good reason
for doing an action that may appear to a human to be questionable. In some cases this
may mean that the AI only needs to be able to communicate that a good reason for a
particular action exists, i.e. to articulate a how-possibly explanation, rather than
communicating the right reason for the action, i.e. a how-actually explanation.
Rationalizations are an attempt to deal with the problems associated with the lack of
XAI without actually solving them. The authors endorse the view that, when it comes
to AI, we must choose between fast, intuitive, human-understandable explanations, and
technically correct explanations. Rationalizations do not attempt to provide
explanations, but instead provide fictional statements that sound like plausible
explanations.
2.2 Why Rationalizations are not Explanations
Rationalizations represent only one attempt to build non-causal XAI, but this attempt
leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of scientific explanation. Rationalizations
are explicitly non-veridical. Fictionalizations often serve a role in scientific explanation.
Many, including Potochnik (2017) and Rice (2018), have argued that fictionalizations
can play a key role in understanding. Rationalizations differ from fictionalizations in
other models. If the understanding that an explanation helps to foster is not in any sense
an understanding of a true state of affairs, then the purported explanation has not
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contributed to epistemic success, and is not actually explanatory. Rationalizations do
not make use of strategic inaccuracies in order to help individuals to come to recognize a
greater truth about the explanandum, rather rationalizations serve to further conceal the
truth behind natural language statements meant to have the appearance of an adequate
explanation with none of its substance. While there may be practical reasons why AI
developers would find it appropriate to make use of rationalizations rather than genuine
explanations, this does not imply that rationalizations have any value as scientific
explanations. Rationalizations are an attempt to articulate “how possibly” explanations
rather than “how actually” explanations. In the case of explanations of high-stakes
automated decisions, “how actually” should be the standard. Rationalizations are not
explanations.
2.3 Case Study Two: Attention Layers in Neural Networks
Attention mechanisms, introduced by Bahdanau et al. (2015), allow the training of a
DNN in such a way as to focus the network’s attention on specific input elements.
Attention mechanisms can be incorporated into neural networks as another layer of the
network as shown in figure 1. The weights of the attention layer are thought to correlate
to measures of feature importance in the input: the input has some features that are
more important than others, and if the attention layer is able to identify which features
of the input are most important, this is thought to generate explanantia by
discriminating between relevant and irrelevant inputs. Allowing the DNN to focus on the
more important parts of the input could increase the accuracy of the output. In the case
of attention as explanation, the explanandum is the output of the DNN, and the
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explanans involves an appeal to the attention layer, which points to specific input
elements. In many cases, it appeared as if the attention layer was explanatory because it
indicated which parts of the input were most important in the creation of the output.
For those evaluating these systems for explanatory value, this appears to be a plausible
explanation, though as I will discuss, there are good reasons for doubting that this is
true.
...
Arbitrary
Deep
Network
AttentionInput Output
Figure 1: Researchers often use attention weights (shown in orange) to generate explanations.
Jain & Wallace scramble attention weights and show that output remains stable; a similar result
is obtained by Serrano & Smith omitting highly-weighted attention nodes entirely.
2.3.1 Critical Responses from Computer Science
Jain and Wallace (2019) argue that the output of the attention layer cannot serve as an
explanation of the underlying DNN because it is possible to intentionally interefere with
the way the weights of the attention layer are set (called “adversarial weighting”) in such
a way that the underlying DNN produces the same output as it did under
non-adversarial weighting while the adversarial attention layer indicates the importance
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of entirely different - and obviously unimportant - elements of the input data. An
example discussed by Jain and Wallace is the use of a DNN to gauge whether a movie
review is positive or negative. The DNN outputs a number between 0 and 1 with 0 being
very negative and 1 being very positive. The attention layer indicates which words in the
movie review (the input) are supposedly more important in determining this output.
Under the non-adversarial case, a word like “waste” would be indicated as important,
whereas under the adversarial weighting, a word like “was” would be indicated as
important. In both the adversarial and non-adversarial cases, the network produced an
identical score for the review.
While the attention weights were set adversarially, they still represent a configuration
that could have occurred during the non-adversarial training of the network. In
developing a neural model under normal conditions, the production of either of the
models (adversarial or non-adversarial) are equally possible. If one expects that the
attention layer can serve as an explantion of the overall model, it must be the result of
the ability of the attention layer to identify the most important features of the input
data, but if selectively randomized attention weightings can produce the same model
output as the actual attention weights, it is difficult to see in what sense the attention
layer could possibly generate an explanation. Jain and Wallace (2019) conclude that it
cannot. Their paper is appropriately titled “Attention is not Explanation.”
Serrano and Smith (2019) make a similar argument, agreeing that attention is not
explanation. Instead of assigning randomized weights to the attention nodes, Serrano
and Smith selectively deleted many of the highest weighted - that is the supposedly most
important - attention nodes. Under these conditions the model still produced the same
output. The experiment demonstrates that if adversarial attention weightings using data
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that should adversely affect the neural model’s accuracy has no such effect, the ability of
the attention layer to discriminate between important and unimportant inputs is called
into question, and so must be any explanations that are derived from attention.
Both of these papers relied on counterfactual analyses of the attention layer in order
to come to thier conclusions: if the attention weights had been different in such and such
a way, the attention layer would have identified a different set of input features, while
the model’s output would have remained unchanged. Implicitly, both are appealing to an
interventionist account of explanation. They are attempting to determine the pattern of
counterfactual dependence among the variables in the DNN. As I show below, due to the
complexity and lack of interpretability of the systems this analysis is being applied to,
the use of the interventionist account here is inappropriate, and is not likely to lead to
the development of XAI.
2.4 Why Attention is not Explanation
Alisa Bokulich (2018) defines ‘causal imperialism’ as the view that “all scientific
explanations are causal explanations” (141). There appears to be a large amount of
causal imperialism in XAI - most attempts at XAI make use of causal explanations
exclusively, assuming that anything other than a causal explanation is a fictionalization
akin to the rationalizations described in section 2.1. Indeed, the bar for explanation
under these conditions is so high that some authors have advocated for abandoning the
project of developing explainable models entirely, opting instead only for models that are
interpretable (Rudin 2019). There are simpler models that exist that are interpretable,
such as decision trees, but they are generally less effective than more complex black box
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models. The tradeoff with these models is that a causal explanation can be more readily
derived when a model is interpretable, because a pattern of counterfactual dependence
within the model is easier to discover.
Given their complexity, a causal account of explanation that successfully explains
DNNs is likely to be impossible because a pattern of counterfactual dependence cannot
be located. The extremely high number of nodes in a DNN, each with an associated
weight, is not human parsable. A complete account of causal relationships among nodes
will also be non-parsable by humans. AI that is non-interpretable will necessarily also be
non-explainable under causal accounts, because to say that a system is non-interpretable
is to say that a pattern of counterfactual dependence cannot be established for that
system. This follows directly from the definition of non-interpretability. A
non-interpretable system is a black box system; when the inner workings of a system are
unknown, the causal relationships between that system’s components cannot be
established. Given the failure of causal accounts in the development of XAI, non-causal
accounts of explanation should be explored instead.
The criticisms of attention as explanation from Jain & Wallace and Serrano & Smith
implicitly make use of an interventionst account of causal explanation similar to that
proposed by Woodward (2003). Because the criticisms of attention as explanation
attempt to establish the existence of empirically verifiable causal patterns that hold
between the explanandum and those factors without which it would not have occurred, it
fits within Woodward’s framework. Woodward explains that “an intervention can be
thought of as an idealized experimental manipulation which changes C ‘surgically’ in
such a way that any change in E, should it occur, will occur only ‘through’ the change in
C and not via some other route” (Woodward 2018, 119).
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In order to determine the existence of causal relationships between variables in a
system of variables, the relevant variables are subject to manipulation. Successful
explanations, on this account, require that targeted manipulations of relevant system
components cause changes in the output of that system when the system output is the
explanandum. If manipulations of these parts cause changes to the system’s output, the
core elements of an explanation are already present. Because the critics of attention as
explanation were able to modify seemingly relevant variables without changing the
system output, they concluded that deriving an explanation from attention is
inappropriate.
The criticisms of attention as explanation implicitly appealed to a view similar to the
interventionist account of explanation, but one without a requirement that some
variables in the system be held invariant such that the interventions on the system are
surgical. Following this requirement ensures that the explanation which is eventually
generated can’t be superseded by another more plausible explanation related to variables
which were not controlled for. In the social sciences, for example, a study of the effects
of diet on longevity that does not control for income is likely to be tainted by many
spurrious connections between variables that are better explained by the relationship
between income and longevity than between diet and longevity. Without holding the
extraneous variables invariant, the appropriate pattern of counterfactual dependence
cannot be established. The absence of this requirement in the criticisms of attention as
explanation may account for the results of these experiments: the discovery of
nonsensical alternative explanations derived through the same means, which allowed the
researchers to cast doubt on both sets of explanations. The situation does not improve
significantly when surgical intervention is used; the problem with applying this approach
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to a DNN is that the number of interconnected nodes is so great that engaging in a
surgical intervention on any one particular node is likely to be impossible as its value
cannot be disentangled from the values of each other node. When making this explicit
and taking this requirement into consideration, the outcome is the same - attention is
not explanation - but for a different reason. In this case attention is not explanation
because under the interventionist framework, it is impossible to engage in surgical
intervention on a DNN, and it is thus impossible to find a pattern of counterfactual
dependence among the relevant variables within the DNN.
Under the manipulability account of causal explanation, surgical intervention is a
method of testing counterfactual conditionals of the form, “if I were to change X in such
and such a way, the result would be Y.” Actually manipulating the value of X tests the
truth of this conditional. Attention is only one part of a larger system of variables. The
relevant system in this case is not attention alone, but attention in addition to the DNN
itself. While both Jain and Wallace and Serrano and Smith demonstrate the possibility
of engaging in surgical intervention on the attention configuration, similar interventions
of the remainder of the system are not possible. When surgical intervention is
impossible, all counterfactuals are rendered unintelligible since surgical intervention is in
one sense merely the testing of a counterfactual conditional. To say that surgical
intervention on a given system is impossible is to say that we cannot know the truth of
certain counterfactual conditionals about that system.
Of the two case studies explored in section 2.1 and section 2.3, what initially
appeared to be the more plausible approach (the use of causal explanations through
attention mechanisms in DNNs) now appears as if it may be a dead end. While the use
of rationalizations explored in section 2.1 has clear flaws, a factor motivating the
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approach, the desire to avoid the messy business of attempting to build causal
explanations of DNNs, may have been correct. In the following section I will explore the
possibility of applying non-causal explanations to DNNs.
3 Applying Non-Causal Accounts of Explanation to
XAI
Both the causal and rationalization approaches to XAI have so far failed to yield good
explanations of the decision process happening inside DNNs. The use of rationalizations
was an attempt to build psychologically satisfying rather than veridical explanations.
The attention example did appear to come closer to an acceptable conclusion. Even if
the conclusion was that attention is not explanatory, the discovery of this fact advances
the discussion and sets up the possibility for the discovery of other causal explanations in
the future. For reasons I discuss below, the use of non-causal explanations is more
appropriate for XAI.
The counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) has causal and non-causal variants.
Computer scientists have previously used causal CTE in attempts to build XAI. See, for
instance, Wachter et al. (2017) and Sharma et al. (2020) These approaches suffer from
many of the same problems identified by computer scientists as discussed in section 2.3.1
and by philosophers as discussed in section 2.4. Alexander Reutlinger (2018) proposes a
pluralist extension of the CTE which would allow for both causal and non-causal
explanations under the CTE. If it is possible to use a non-causal variant of the CTE to
explain DNNs, it might be possible to overcome the objections described in sections 2.3.1
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and 2.4.
Mathematical explanation, another candidate category of non-causal explanation of
AI, comes, according to Colyvan et al. (2018), in two varieties: intra-mathematical and
extra-mathematical. Intra-mathematical explanation is “the explanation of one
mathematical fact in terms of other mathematical facts,” while extra-mathematical
explanation is “the explanation of some physical phenomenon via appeal to
mathematical facts” (Colyvan et al. 2018, 232). Extra-mathematical explanation holds
great promise for XAI because all DNNs are mathematical. One possible problem is that
the relationship between the math used to build AI models and the world is more
complicated than, e.g. the relationship between the mathematics used for graph theory
when representing the bridges in the city of Ko¨nigsburg as a graph and the actual city of
Ko¨nigsburg. If an AI classifier is putting images in categories, it can be described and
explained in mathematical terms, but the relevant question we seem to want answered
isn’t about the math, but about the connection between the math and the world. The
question of how an AI knows the difference between strawberries and bananas isn’t a
question limited to its internal mathematical operations because it is also appealing -
even if implicitly - to the actual difference between strawberries and bananas. The Seven
Bridges of Ko¨nigsburg problem can be solved with graph theory, but the explanation is
still recognizable as representing the actual city of Ko¨nigsburg. The connection between
mathematics and the world in this case is clear, but it is not clear in the case of
extra-mathematical explanations of AI.
The potential for the use of models as explanations has been disccused by Bokulich
(2011), Batterman & Rice (2014), Morrison (2015), and Potochnik (2017) among others.
Model explanations are an exciting possibility for DNNs because DNNs produce models
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which are used in decision and classification tasks. If models can serve as explanations,
the explanation for deep DNNs could be found in the models they produce (referred to
as deep neural models). One major problem with this approach is that with the types of
explanatory models discussed in the philosophy of science literature, the model and the
phenomena being modeled are different, but in the case of DNNs, the model is the
phenomenon that needs to be explained. It is clear from the literature how a model
could be explanatory of some external phenomenon, but it is not clear how a model
could explain itself. It may be the case that the deep neural model explains the DNN
rather than explaining itself, but then the problem of how to explain the model still
remains. An explanation of the network that does not also explain the model (which is
ultimately responsible for decision and classification tasks) is not enough. It isn’t just
the DNN which requires an explanation, but the DNN and the model it produces.
4 Conclusion
Because of the high stakes of AI-based decision and classification tasks, explanations of
DNNs, deep neural models, and the decisions and classifications they produce are
necessary. Computer scientists have attempted to develop explanations of these systems,
but their efforts are inadequately grounded in theories of explanation. The study of
scientific explanation by the philosophy of science is well suited to this task. non-causal
accounts appear to have greater potential to explain DNNs than causal accounts.
Non-causal variants of the CTE, extra-mathematical explanations, and model
explanations all have potential to provide explanations of DNNs in the future, though
more work needs to be done before this is possible. The persistent problems surrounding
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explanations of DNNs point to problems with existing accounts of scientific explanation
and indicate the necessity for the extension of existing accounts of scientific explanation
or the development of new accounts.
17
References
Bahdanau, Dzmitry, Kyunghyun Cho, and Yoshua Bengio. “Neural machine translation
by jointly learning to align and translate.” In Proceedings of ICLR. 2015.
Batterman, Robert W., and Collin C. Rice. “Minimal Model Explanations.” Philosophy
of Science 81, no. 3 (2014): 349–376. 10.1086/676677.
Bennett, Cynthia L, and Os Keyes. “What is the Point of Fairness? Disability, AI and
The Complexity of Justice.” In Workshop on AI Fairness for People with Disabilities
at ACM SIGACCESS Conference on Computers and Accessibility. 2019.
Bokulich, Alisa. “Searching for Non-Causal Explanations in a Sea of Causes.” Edited by
Alexander Reutlinger and Juha Saatsi. Chap. 7 in Explanation Beyond Causation,
141–163. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Buckner, Cameron. “Deep Learning: A Philosophical Introduction.” Philosophy Compass
14, no. 10 (2019). 10.1111/phc3.12625.
Fuster, Andreas, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, Tarun Ramadorai, and Ansgar Walther.
“Predictably unequal? the effects of machine learning on credit markets.” The Effects
of Machine Learning on Credit Markets (November 6, 2018), 2018.
Harrison, Brent, Upol Ehsan, and Mark O. Riedl. “Rationalization: A Neural Machine
Translation Approach to Generating Natural Language Explanations.” CoRR
abs/1702.07826 (2017).
Jain, Sarthak, and Byron C Wallace. “Attention is not Explanation.” In Proceedings of
the 2019 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for
18
Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long and
Short Papers), 3543–3556. 2019.
Khademi, Aria, and Vasant Honavar. “Algorithmic Bias in Recidivism Prediction: A
Causal Perspective.” ArXiv abs/1911.10640 (2019).
Mark Colyvan, John Cusbert, and Kelvin McQueen. “Two Flavours of Mathematical
Explanation.” Edited by Alexander Reutlinger and Juha Saatsi. Chap. 11 in
Explanation Beyond Causation, 231–249. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Morrison, Margaret. Reconstructing Reality: Models, Mathematics, and Simulations.
N.p.: Oup Usa, 2015.
Potochnik, A. Idealization and the Aims of Science. N.p.: University of Chicago Press,
2017.
Reutlinger, Alexander. “Extending the Counterfactual Theory of Explanation.” Edited
by Alexander Reutlinger and Juha Saatsi. Chap. 4 in Explanation Beyond Causation,
74–95. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Rice, Collin. “Idealized Models, Holistic Distortions, and Universality.” Synthese 195,
no. 6 (2018): 2795–2819.
Rudin, Cynthia. “Stop explaining black box machine learning models for high stakes
decisions and use interpretable models instead.” Nature Machine Intelligence 1, no. 5
(2019): 206–215.
Serrano, Sofia, and Noah A Smith. “Is Attention Interpretable?” In Proceedings of ACL.
2019.
19
Sharma, Shubham, Jette Henderson, and Joydeep Ghosh. “CERTIFAI: A Common
Framework to Provide Explanations and Analyse the Fairness and Robustness of
Black-Box Models.” In Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and
Society, 166–172. AIES ’20. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing
Machinery, 2020. 10.1145/3375627.3375812.
Wachter, Sandra, Brent D. Mittelstadt, and Chris Russell. “Counterfactual Explanations
without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR.” CoRR
abs/1711.00399 (2017).
Woodward, James. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford
Studies in Philosophy of Science. N.p.: Oxford University Press, 2003.
. “Some Varieties of Non-Causal Explanation.” Edited by Alexander Reutlinger
and Juha Saatsi. Chap. 6 in Explanation Beyond Causation, 117–137. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018.
Yang, Diyi, Aaron Halfaker, Robert E Kraut, and Eduard H Hovy. “Who Did What:
Editor Role Identification in Wikipedia.” In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on
Web and Social Media (ICWSM), 446–455. 2016.
20
